The argument that political concerns should be detached from humanitarian assistance is predicated on the right of civilians to immediate access to humanitarian aid; a right which must not be held ransom to longterm political objectives. This position carries a lot of weight, especially when political objectives are narrowly defined as regime change and indigenous voices speaking of alternative political concerns are drowned out by the 'loudspeaker diplomacy' of certain Western powers. As Pederson described this trend, "By identifying a transfer of power to the NLD as the immediate and, in some cases, only objective, Western countries have given up the opportunity to help improve current conditions and build the basis for a gradual transition " (2005: 170) .
Despite the debate over the proper relationship between politics and humanitarian assistance, there is a general agreement about the crucial role of long term governance reform as a means to go beyond external (INGO, bilateral, and UN) service provision in addressing the country's widespread humanitarian needs (for example , Duffield 2008: 41-2) . Yet, such nationallevel political reform (especially when conflated with regime change and democratization) can appear quite distant to the immediate humanitarian concerns of the civilian population. This understanding, however, while relevant, has led to the adoption of two notable fallacies within international approaches to the humanitarian situation in Burma.
The first of these fallacies is that political concerns and political engagement remain the exclusive domains of the organized elite (whether the current military regime, democratic opposition parties or ethnic insurgent groups). By contrast, as Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung has shown, the country's predominantly rural population does have strong political concerns, but their views tend to be more focused on the local-level implementation of State policy than they are on the "high profile issues singled out by the international press" (2003: 8). The second notable fallacy is that nationallevel political reform and ostensibly 'apolitical' (yet State-regulated) humanitarian assistance are the only two approaches available for addressing the country's humanitarian concerns. Both of these approaches remain overly focused on elite politics and perpetuate a top-down model of intervention which marginalizes local voices.
While problematic to begin with, this debate has become especially limiting in regards to protection measures for internally displaced persons The assistance-protection relationship is further complicated in Karen State and other areas of (especially rural) Burma where persistent human rights abuses underlie the deteriorating humanitarian situation to which humanitarian assistance is meant to apply.
As with humanitarian assistance more generally, conventional IDP protection frameworks are likewise biased towards a top-down model of politically-averse intervention which marginalizes local initiatives to resist abuse and hinders local control over protection efforts (Heppner 2005: 31 
Displacement patterns in Karen State
The 1998 We fled because we were oppressed by the SPDC. We didn't get any permission to travel. They wouldn't give us any travel documents. They were making us do construction work. So, we couldn't do our own work. Not all villagers, however, respond in the same ways to similar displacement pressures and discrepancies in choice exist between members of the same village and even the same household (South 2007: 66) . While the residents of some SPDC-controlled communities may be unable to flee (often due to movement restrictions and/or local military threats), others may actively choose to remain in their home (or relocated) communities as long as they can maintain some means of livelihood and address their needs.
However, in this context, persistent demands for labor, money, food and supplies threaten to increase poverty, exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and thereby heighten displacement pressures (Heppner 2005: 11) . In these situations, villagers have also sought to resist, mitigate or wholly evade compliance with abusive demands, but without abandoning their homes; their ability to successfully resist such exploitation lessens displacement pressures.
Under threat of violent enforcement, village-level resistance to exploitative demands includes a broad assortment of strategies ranging from the subtle to the overt which villagers continue to test and refine. These The SPDC soldiers demanded taxes for the plantations, hill fields and flat fields. They also asked us for the number of households in our village. We told them we had only over 80 households, not over 100 households. We took out the widows' and orphans' households because we thought that if they demanded taxes from us, the widows and orphans shouldn't need to pay them.
They [the villagers] had to carry things for the SPDC and also had to cut bamboo poles for them. I didn't want to see it [the forced labor], so I warned them [SPDC authorities] that 'If you continue to order the villagers to do these things, the news [of the forced labor demands] will spread out from BBC and VOA 2 .' After that they reduced the forced labor. At first the villagers had to cut bamboo poles twice a month or once a month. After I confronted them the villagers didn't need to do this [particular type of] work anymore.
Villagers also regularly employ jokes and counternarratives to challenge the legitimacy of local structures of authority or, where possible, villagers may temporarily flee to avoid military demands altogether. These efforts -while largely 'humanitarian' in their attempts to address issues of livelihood, poverty, and subsistence -are clearly political in their resistance to local expressions of State power and authority. They can be understood within the framework of James Scott's theory of 'everyday resistance' comprising "the nearly continuous, informal, undeclared, disguised forms of autonomous resistance by lower classes" (1989: 4). KHRG calls this village-level initiative and capacity to resist abuse in rural Burma "village agency" (Phan and Hull 2008: 19) .
Drawing on Scott's work, Kerkvliet (2002) argues for an understanding of 'everyday politics' that goes beyond a narrow conception of formal alliances and factions expressly challenging or supporting de jure State authority and legislative powers. Rather, it should include the "debates, conflicts, decisions, and cooperation among individuals, groups, and organizations regarding the control, allocation, and use of resources and the values and ideas underlying those activities" which are "a part of daily life" (Kerkvliet 2002: 11) .
Village-level resistance to local expressions of the 'predatory State' comprises a form of 'everyday politics' intimately tied to displacement. The successful execution of resistance strategies can reduce the humanitarian aspect of displacement pressures. Where this resistance proves insufficient, villagers may flee to IDP hiding sites, urban areas inside Burma, refugee camps in Thailand or seek work as migrant laborers abroad. Efforts to "escape from a predatory military" thus underlie, at least in part, the current large-scale urban migration of rural communities in Burma (Steinberg 2005: 131) .
Conventional frameworks for IDP protection
Despite the increasing international attention on IDP issues, no international legal instrument has yet to define "what IDP protection involves," (Phuong 2005: 119) Burma. These included prohibitions on "conducting or distributing any surveys not mentioned and approved in the original project documentation," (GAO 2007: 18) . The UN reports that the resulting "data weaknesses have impeded international organizations' efforts to assess needs, conduct strategic planning and implement programs" (GAO 2007: 24) . These restrictions serve to suppress local voices and marginalize the 'everyday politics' of village communities, thus obstructing humanitarian agencies' efforts to support indigenous IDP protection strategies. They also conflict with "On-going monitoring of the protection requirements of internally displaced persons, and how these needs are being addressed" which remain crucial for any effective external implementation of IDP protection programs (Inter-Agency 1999: 10).
Concluding remarks
In the context of Burma's State-society conflict, the IDP protection mandates of humanitarian agencies are inevitably political insofar as these agencies must either support or marginalize the resistance strategies of rural villagers; strategies which challenge local expressions of State power and authority and which constitute persistent forms of 'everyday politics'. Village-level efforts to resist abuse remain the most effective IDP protection measures currently employed in Karen State and other parts of rural Burma and their success is, as Scott observed, "contingent on relations of power, " (1989: 12) .
The effective implementation by humanitarian agencies of any IDP protection mandate thus depends on their willingness and ability to listen to local villagers about the situation of abuse they face and their own efforts to resist this abuse and to support these admittedly political strategies; strengthening villagers' positions in their 'relations of power' with local authorities; increasing the options through which rural communities can decide for themselves how to best respond to abuse; and avoiding activities which undermine village-level resistance strategies or otherwise strengthen State power and control over civilians at the local level. As appropriate external support for local resistance strategies inevitably depends on local context, a point of departure would be the establishment of alternative fora free of State control where indigenous communities and community-based organizations can openly engage international humanitarian agencies, discuss their own efforts to resist abuse and proffer initiatives on how these efforts can be practicably supported.
